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BOOK REVIEWS
By Charles T. McCormick.
St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1954. 774 pages. $10.00.

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.

In this admirable text, the author has produced a scholarly
and readable concentrate of the law of evidence. If one wants
an exhaustive treatment of the multi-faceted problems of evidence
law, he must still turn to Wigmore's opus. But for the neophyte
practicing attorney who wants a bird's-eye view of the highlights
of the principles of evidence, this volume is unsurpassed. The
older practitioner or judge will likewise find it to be clear and
concise refresher and a useful tool with which to begin his
unraveling of the web of authority encompassing each evidence
problems as he encounters.
Professor McCormick in his preface admits that his treatment
is highly selective, with no pretensions to completeness. Although
it is true that the book does not cover the complete field of
evidence law, nevertheless all the highlighted areas of the law
are thoroughly developed. Not only is the existing practice reported, but the author has soundly and ably expounded his
views as to changes needed to improve the administration of
justice. Undoubtedly this work will have a telling impact upon
the future trend of many rules of evidence.
After an opening chapter on preparation and presentation of
the evidence, the author proceeds to discuss problems inherent
in the examination of witnesses. He advoactes a general relaxation, especially in trials before the judge without a jury, of
the exclusionary rules, and he urges a modification of the rules
of privilege for confidiential communications, in the interest of
ascertaining truth. Arguments are well-supported with commonsense reasoning and frequent references to recent findings in
the fields of psychiatry and psychology.
Rules of competency and privilege are thoroughly discussed
and many are soundly criticized as barriers to the ascertainment
of truth. The author favors a general lowering of these barriers.
The privilege against self incrimination, legislative investigations,
immunity statutes, and laws relating to wire-tapping are well
considered, and the practical problems inherent in the area where
police powers clash with individual liberty are convincingly submitted and solved.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

Other suggestions advocated by Professor McCormick include
greater use by the Court of its powers to call expert unbiased
witnesses, and restricted use of the unwieldy hypothetical question
in favor of straightforward examination and cross-examination.
The chapters on experimental and scientific evidence contain
authentic up-to-date information on such controversial subjects as
lie-detector tests, chemical tests for drunkenness, and blood tests
tp determine paternity.
Of course the "best evidence" rule and the "parol evidence" rule
are thoroughly treated, and as in any work on evidence, the "hearsay rule" and its exceptions are analyzed. Nine chapters consisting
of more than 200 pages are devoted to this phase of the law of
evidence. The closing chapters are dedicated to an understanding
of the burden of proof, presumptions, and judicial notice.
Generous case citations are supplied throughout the text, with
references to Wigmore, A.L.R., the West Digest System and other
volumes accessible to the average lawyer. There are numerous
citations to legal periodicals, and discussions by the author of
the merits of the Uniform Rules of Evidence.
Professor McCormick in this work has furnished the legal
profession with an able, scholarly and concise treatise upon the
law of evidence.
DAvIb KESSLER*

By Hans B. Thorelli. Baltimore:
The John Hopkins Press, 1954. 65S pages.

THE

FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY.

Out of the annual maze of social science literature there comes
upon occasion certain classic works that show every sign of enduring significance. Such a work is The Federal Antitrust Policy.
Hans Thorelli, as historian, economist, and lawyer, is emminently
qualified for the grandoise task of historically disecting the government's approach to the ever unpopular dragon of "big business".
He is a Swedish observer surveying the anti-trust scene with
detached perspective yet with the authoritative familiarity born
only of extended research. The anti-trust problem, as distinguished
from the English monopoly and cartel problem, is uniquely American, nevertheless few scholars have attempted to go beyond legal
concepts to consider the interplay of group interests and popular
opinion. Moreover, only cursory attention has been given in the
*Member
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past to the early years of the Sherman Act on the assumption
that prior to Theodore Roosevelt there was little worth noting
in anti-trust development; that the only policy was an absence
of policy. This assumption, well subscribed to, is not completely
amiss although Author Thorelli very effectively challenges the
concept.
The background of the Sherman Act is traced to its origins in
English common law. Covenants in restraint of trade were held
unenforceable only because of a feeling that the person so disabling
himself would become a public ward. The undermining of the guild
system and the corresponding demand for greater contract flexibility brought about a relaxation of the rule against contracts in
restraint of trade. Early 17th century English cases first defined
the distinction between general and partial restraints and declared partial restraints, i.e., those relating to a certain time and
place, were enforceable. It is from these early cases that American judges later developed the much-controverted "Rule of Reason"
which was to guide judicial interpretation of monopolistic practice
for over a century. The impulse of laissez-faire economics gradually smoothed the way for an almost complete abandonment of
English anti-monopoly policy.
The golden era of trade, 1750-1850, was marked by almost
unrestricted contractual freedom. While there were numerous
divergencies of opinion as to the applicability of common law to
American monopoly cases, Thorelli found that almost invariably
business arrangements involving trade restraints before the Sherman Act were held unenforceable. In the United States, all of
these common law concepts were applied by state and not federal
courts due, in large part, to absence of a federal common law
which necessarily caused a lack of uniformity in judicial direction.
The end of the Civil War marked the start of the big business
problem in America. The newly found corporate device created
the huge (in terms of 19th century thinking) industries which
were to become problem children. Semantically, there were few
real trusts, most of the businesses being loose associations or
pools. Thorelli gives a vivid insight into the workings of a real
trust, notably the infamous Standard Oil Trust of 1882.1 "Economic Darwinism", the premise that survival of the fittest was
good law for business as well as humans, emerged as the rationale
1. It is interesting that this trust was one of the few that was broken up state action.
Had all the states enforced their existing statutes there would have been no federal trust
problem.
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for the gospel of wealth as preached by Andrew Carnegie. Thus
the cut-throat competition of the trust was equated with nature's
continuing struggle for existence and therefore sanctioned as a
natural right. The industrialist warned Congress not to regulate
or tamper with this jungle law but asked for postive assistance in
making it work by receiving land grants, tariffs ,and subsidies.
In an-era where regulation of business receives unquestioned
acceptance, it is difficult to realize the lack of alarm over the increasing complexity of financial pyramiding. It was not until the
middle 1880's that the major political parties gave token recognition to the trusts by incorporating anti-trust planks in their
platform. The newspapers began blasting the big interests editorially and the muckrackers shined the first light of publicity on
trust activity. In 1888, the Sherman Act was introduced and amid
constant attack as to constitutionality, it survived a two year intermittent debate. The objective sought was a moderate limitation
on freedom of contract without unduly hampering freedom of
enterprise. The value of the Act in its early years was that it became an instrument of preserving a psychological climate favorable to competition. The wording of the Act was vague and needed
interpretation by the courts but the corporations were quite
unwilling to press the issue. There was no active enforcement of
the Act under Presidents Harrison, Cleveland and McKinleyall of them giving verbal acquiescence on principle but none willing to pioneer enforcement. Thorelli sets 1903 as the date antitrust was institutionalized. It. was on that date that the three
concurrent objectives were achieved necessary to limiting monopoly:
1. The Act passed the test of constitutionality; 2. Broad terms
of Act became sufficiently defined; 3. The executive, in the person
of Teddy Roosevelt, aggressively enforced the Act.
Mr. Thorelli has indeed made an exhaustive evaluation of this
period, drawing upon administrative archives of the Department
of Justice as well as significant works of previous scholars.
Combined with much original research, he substantiates his statements with over 600 case citations, many reported in detail. While
studies of this period are by no means rare, the signal importance
of this work lies in his delicate synthesis of the three forces operating upon trusts: law, economics and public opinion. On the basis
of this he takes an iconoclastic delight in demolishing many accepted ideas: e.g., that the courts were primarily responsible for
the weakness of law enforcement in the early years; that the
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reliance upon the offices of the United States attorneys was the
principle administrative weakness; that private litigation was unimportant; that the Northern Securities case 2 was the legal turning
point.
Too much of the author's time is spent in spinning a fine web
of insignificant legislative history, however, such minor faults
of verbosity and pedantry can be overlooked for the purpose of
exploring all avenues of the problem. Throelli does not speak
from the all too common 'point of view' angle but rather is
devoid of predetermined concepts in an area where prejudice
can often obscure vision and where opinion is not always labeled
as such. The work is enthusiastically endorsed for all who believe law, to be fully understood, must be studied in historical
retrospection with the attendant desire to grasp the socio-economic
patterns working upon it.
JAMES H. O'KEEFE

THE SUPREME COURT IN

THE AMERICAN

SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

By Robert H. Jackson. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
University Press, 1955. 92 pages. Price: $2.00.

Harvard

This book consists of three lectures which were to be delivered
by Mr. Justice Jackson, as the Godkin lecturer in February 1955..2
The author demonstrates an ability to express himself clearly
and concisely. In the first lecture entitled "The Supreme Court as
a Unit of Government", the authof points out the independent
characteristics of the Court when contrasted with the English
system. Yet, upon close scrutiny, the interdependence of judiciary
of this country upon the other two branches of government in
relation to finance, enforcement of orders, appointment of judges
and right to jurisdiction is made apparent. Following this the
author discusses the importance of the Court's function accompanied by the following general observation: "The real strength
of the position of the Court is probably in its indispensability to
government under a written Constitution." The Justice also illustrates in brief form, the routine of the Court in handling the
2. Northern Securities Company v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903). Generally
thought to be the leading case. as to the government's power to effectively regulate business
associations under the provisions of the Sherman Act.
1. Robert H. Jackson died on October 9, 1954.
2. The Godkin lectures were established at Harvard
Edwin Lawrence Godkin (1831-1902).
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flood of cases which seek determination in the country's highest
legal tribunal.
The second lecture is entitled "The Supreme Court as a Law
Court". Due to the unpopularity of British law in the late
eighteenth century, it is pointed out, the Court was "launched
without a jurisprudence". Add to this the fact that the Court
was provided with no books, which the author states "probably
accounts for the high quality of early opinions", and the result
was that the law followed politics and public opinion closely.
Mr. Justice Jackson severely criticizes federal jurisdiction based
on diversity of citizenship. He attributes crowded federal calendars and the consequences to this unnecessary "dual jurisdiction"
of state and federal courts. Historically such federal jurisdiction
was justified by unfair treatment which a foreign litigant was
likely to receive in a state court. The author insists this objection is no longer present and feels that state courts should handle
these cases, thus relieving the federal courts of about one half
of their present case load.
The third lecture is entitled "The Superme Court as a Political
Institution". Throughout this chapter state v. federal power is
discussed with an obvious tendency on the part of the writer
to look with disfavor on federal usurpation of state powers. Here
the Tenth Amendment" gains a distinguished advocate.
Mr. Justice Jackson was at all times keenly aware of the
methods employed by ideologies inconsistent with democracy.
He wrote, "I cannot say that our country could have no central
police without becoming totalitarian, but I can say with great
conviction that it cannot become totalitarian without a centralized
national police." The book is not without humor, and its humor is
not without a point. Speaking of administrative agencies the author
said, "The right of self-correction is not an exclusive prerogative
of the judiciary. But different questions arise when the change is
retroactive." Fundamentally, however, this book gives the reader
insight to the thoughts of one who has had great influence on
our jurisprudence, politics and sociology.
JON

N.

VOGEL

3. U. S. Const. amend. X, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
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By Dwight G. McCarty. New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. 525 pages. Third edition.

LAW OFFICE MANAGEMENT.

The practicing lawyer, rapt in the solution of legal problems,
is seldom an efficient office manager. This would not seem to be
a matter of great concern unless inefficiency in firm management
materially effects the quality or quantity of his work. If this be
the case, then one need only turn to McCarty's Law Office
Management.
An encyclopedia covering the business side of the law practice,
it is a highly specialized work. The topics covered range from
well planned filing and bookkeeping systems, to the keeping of
"golf-ball" suckers handy for the restless child client.
Office management of a law firm would normally be viewed
as no more than a necessary evil. This might make excellence
in the field a dim achievement to most. McCarty, of course, is of
a different mind. Picturing the lawyer in these changing times
as one, "who grinds out his life in hope!ess bondage to the practice,"
and "burns himself out day and night trying to keep up with
the load," McCarty finds efficient office management an effective
panacea.
The place of a specialized study of this nature can readily be
conceded. The need for accurate and systematic handling of
routine office work is often overlooked by the practicing attorney.
McCarty's book competently covers this field. The work, however,
suffers from trite observations and excessive detail. It is doubtful
that many attorneys would lend attentive ears to the author's
discussion of the "proper" law office pencil, or the "proper" position
of the telephone on the attorney's desk. The extreme detail, in many
instances, however, is justified. This to the lawyer seeking information on a particular topic or suggested method of procedure,
could be most beneficial. Even the well established firm might
well consider the suggested filing system, bookkeeping system,
time cards, dockets, ticklers, reference files, and the innumerable
other items. The work presents well tested office procedure,
and has been carefully adapted to fit the needs of both the large
and small law firm. Any attorney who is conscious of the awkward
features of his present practice will surely find the solution in
McCarty. However, in some instances, the revolution in procedure and the tiring, conformance to detail might offset the
efficiency to be gained.
WILLIAM C.

KELSCH

